『壹』 這段關於經濟學的英語怎麼翻譯啊~~~~
價格上限是不具有約束力，如果上述規定的均衡價格。價格上限是有約束力的，如果設置低於均衡價格，導致短缺。
『貳』 經濟學英語高手進
我這里湊個分子：
1.人均消費水平 per capita comsuption level
2.前期消費水平 (應該是杜森貝利Duesenberry理論中的「前一期消費水平」的誤讀）preceding calendar comsuption level
3.人均國內生產總值 per-capita GDP (Gross Domestic Proct)
4.全省商品零售價格指數（基比）retail price index of the pronvice.
5.中國人民銀行一年期儲蓄存款利率PBC(People's Bank of China) interest rate on one-year deposits savings.
『叄』 一個經濟學問題（英語）英語回答
the demand for labor will decrease since the cost of an employee rise up.
the supply of labor will increase because employers are benefitied
when wage is free to balance supply and demand for labor, the subsequence of this law is that the labor supply curve move right and the demand curve move left,so this law maybe doesn't affect the level of employment and the wage will rise.Then employers worse off while employees better off.
『肆』 經濟學問題（英語達人進）
factors affecting PED:
i) price
ii) price of other goods (either complement or substitute)
iii) income
iv) tastes and fashion
factors affecting PES
i) cost
ii) price
iii) technology
iv) no. of procers, i.e. strength of competition
Im 100% sure my answers are completely right.
『伍』 用英語介紹自己對經濟學的理解
這個只有經濟學是直接用英文學的才能寫。而真正學好的，怎麼會在這里回答問題呢？
『陸』 求經濟學的英語專業術語網站
http://www.docin.com/p-25446691.html
這有很多金融的術語
『柒』 經濟學包含哪些領域，用英語介紹一下經濟學是一個什麼樣的專業
我是經濟專業的，希望能幫到你！
Economics：the study of how society manages its scarce resources.
翻譯：經濟學：一門研究社會如何管理自己的稀缺資源的學科。
Scarity：the limited nature of society『s resources.
翻譯：稀缺性：社會資源的有限性。
一般來講，經濟學分為微觀經濟學和宏觀經濟學：
Microeconomics：the study of how households and firms make decisions and how they interact in specific markets.
翻譯：微觀經濟學：一門研究家庭和企業如何做出決策，以及他們如何在市場上進行交易的學科。
Macroeconomics：the study of economy wide phenomena.
宏觀經濟學：一門研究整體的經濟現象（通貨膨脹、失業和經濟增長）的學科。
『捌』 誰能找到《經濟學家》裡面關於墨西哥灣漏油事件的英語文章，高分獎勵喲。
http://www.economist.com/node/14548839 直接點進去 上面有~~
如下是內容（給你參考下哈）：
IT IS bad enough that Mexico』s economy is in deep recession, triggered by its close links to the ailing United States. To make matters worse, the country』s oil instry, its fiscal cash-cow for the past three decades, is declining swiftly (see chart). As recently as 2004 Cantarell, the country』s main offshore field, proced 2.1m barrels per day (b/d) of crude. Now its output is just 600,000 b/d. There are no obvious replacements: 23 of the 32 biggest fields are in decline. Barring big new finds, the world』s seventh-largest oil procer is forecast to become a net importer by 2017.
The Mexican treasury is ill-prepared for this. Taxes and royalties from Pemex, the state-owned oil monopoly, have accounted for almost two-fifths of federal revenues in recent years, compensating for one of Latin America』s weakest tax regimes (which collects just 11% of GDP). If oil output drops below 2m b/d, as many instry-watchers fear, the government would be forced to cut spending by more than 10%—or jack up taxes correspondingly, to avoid an unsustainable budget deficit. This might threaten economic recovery.
There is no mystery behind the decline. The constitution bans private investment in hydrocarbons. Ever since Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated foreign oil companies in 1938, the state oil monopoly has been seen by many politicians, especially from the formerly ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and its offshoots, as the untouchable bone marrow of Mexican sovereignty. To make matters worse, Pemex has been run more in the interests of its workers and their trade unions than of the Mexican people, its notional owners.
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All this has curbed the country』s ability to capitalise on its geological wealth. Since many oil-exploration projects take longer than the six-year presidential term to bear fruit, the politicians have a powerful incentive to spend oil revenues rather than reinvest them. From 1983 to 2000 Pemex』s annual investment budget was a paltry $3 billion. Until recently Cantarell』s bounty disguised this. After the conservative National Action Party (PAN) broke the PRI』s seven-decade grip on power in 2000, Pemex started to invest more. But higher labour and equipment costs absorbed much of the increase. Much of the new money was ploughed into Chicontepec, a project in the state of Veracruz that Pemex hoped would replace Cantarell. But this is yielding just 29,000 b/d so far.
Opportunity beckons beneath the deeper waters of the Gulf of Mexico, where some 50 billion barrels of oil are thought to rest. In the American part of the Gulf, 300 or so deepwater wells are drilled each year. Last month Britain』s BP found a big new field (with perhaps 3 billion barrels) there. Pemex has drilled just ten deepwater wells, but found little oil. It lacks the expertise, technology and capital it needs.
Even if Mexico allowed private companies to explore for oil, they would have to invest $10 billion a year to halt the decline in output, reckons David Shields, who edits a specialist magazine on Mexican oil. Under today』s law, in which private firms can only act as service providers for Pemex, that investment would be much higher, he says.
Felipe Calderón, the president, has tried to address the problem. A law approved last year is supposed to make Pemex more agile, by appointing independent directors and separating its contracts from government-procurement proceres. But to gain the opposition』s votes in Congress he dropped a key proposal that would have allowed contract prices to vary according to the success or failure of exploration. Pemex will be able to pay extra in some circumstances, but is explicitly barred from linking these incentives to proction.
To implement this vaguely worded legislation, Mr Calderón last month appointed Juan José Suárez Coppel to head Pemex. He was once its finance director, and has private-sector experience. His job will be to pilot the negotiations with private oil-service firms. The government has not yet published guidelines for these contracts, and no deals are expected until next year. Few are optimistic about them. 「Companies are used to calling things by their names,」 says Luis Miguel Labardini, an energy consultant. 「This game of syntax, of finding a semantic formula to match 『proctivity improvements』 or 『cost efficiencies』 to output, is going to be too much for them.」
Mr Calderón last month called for a second energy reform. Much could be done even without changing the constitution, by linking the value of service contracts to proction and slimming Pemex, where the payroll of 143,000 is at least 30,000 too big. But it is hard to see discussion on a new law before the previous one has even been implemented, and harder still to foresee its approval, since the PRI and its allies gained a majority in the lower house of Congress in a mid-term election in July. Some PRI leaders have ties to the oil workers』 union. And big lay-offs in the trough of recession would anyway be politically toxic. Sooner or later fiscal reality will force change. But by then the oil age may be over.
『玖』 求一句英語翻譯 經濟學的 摘自拉姆齊(Ramsey)1928年發布的a mathematical theory of saving
儲蓄率乘以消費來的邊際效應源 應總等於 效用總的凈享樂率和最大可能享樂率的差值。
參考http://www.tianya.cn/New/PublicForum/Content.asp?idArticle=145596&strItem=develop
『拾』 經濟學專業的英語翻譯，實在搞不好
請注意，在決定預算線降BB'的價格比率下，Agent選擇消費組合（消費束）E。但是，由於專這一消費組合屬在一無差異曲線扭結點發生，邊際替代率必須等於預算線的斜率的條件不能滿足。在E點左邊，邊際替帶率比預算線陡峭，而到了E點的右邊，邊際替帶率比預算線平坦。不過，在這些價格下，只有一個最佳消費組合。但是這是不正確的，那就是當Agent面臨由預算線BB』描述的陡峭的價格率時。在這里預算線與無差異曲線相切，這意味著在這個價格下，Agent沒有與任何高於預算線的消費組合有任何不同。
價格消費路徑如圖3.9a所示，相應的需求曲線如圖Figure3.9b所示。請注意此時需求曲線有平坦部分，這表明在不同的價格下可以有巨大的需求量。
總之，如果我們的需求分析偏離定價人限定的消費，即我們在Chapter2中所示（假設偏好、不滿意、自私凸出），那麼可能會產生一些古怪的需求曲線。通過接受這些假設，我們可以保證我們的需求曲線將不會猛漲，也能保證他們在每一個價格下有一個獨特的需求量。