『壹』 这段关于经济学的英语怎么翻译啊~~~~
价格上限是不具有约束力，如果上述规定的均衡价格。价格上限是有约束力的，如果设置低于均衡价格，导致短缺。
『贰』 经济学英语高手进
我这里凑个分子：
1.人均消费水平 per capita comsuption level
2.前期消费水平 (应该是杜森贝利Duesenberry理论中的“前一期消费水平”的误读）preceding calendar comsuption level
3.人均国内生产总值 per-capita GDP (Gross Domestic Proct)
4.全省商品零售价格指数（基比）retail price index of the pronvice.
5.中国人民银行一年期储蓄存款利率PBC(People's Bank of China) interest rate on one-year deposits savings.
『叁』 一个经济学问题（英语）英语回答
the demand for labor will decrease since the cost of an employee rise up.
the supply of labor will increase because employers are benefitied
when wage is free to balance supply and demand for labor, the subsequence of this law is that the labor supply curve move right and the demand curve move left,so this law maybe doesn't affect the level of employment and the wage will rise.Then employers worse off while employees better off.
『肆』 经济学问题（英语达人进）
factors affecting PED:
i) price
ii) price of other goods (either complement or substitute)
iii) income
iv) tastes and fashion
factors affecting PES
i) cost
ii) price
iii) technology
iv) no. of procers, i.e. strength of competition
Im 100% sure my answers are completely right.
『伍』 用英语介绍自己对经济学的理解
这个只有经济学是直接用英文学的才能写。而真正学好的，怎么会在这里回答问题呢？
『陆』 求经济学的英语专业术语网站
http://www.docin.com/p-25446691.html
这有很多金融的术语
『柒』 经济学包含哪些领域，用英语介绍一下经济学是一个什么样的专业
我是经济专业的，希望能帮到你！
Economics：the study of how society manages its scarce resources.
翻译：经济学：一门研究社会如何管理自己的稀缺资源的学科。
Scarity：the limited nature of society‘s resources.
翻译：稀缺性：社会资源的有限性。
一般来讲，经济学分为微观经济学和宏观经济学：
Microeconomics：the study of how households and firms make decisions and how they interact in specific markets.
翻译：微观经济学：一门研究家庭和企业如何做出决策，以及他们如何在市场上进行交易的学科。
Macroeconomics：the study of economy wide phenomena.
宏观经济学：一门研究整体的经济现象（通货膨胀、失业和经济增长）的学科。
『捌』 谁能找到《经济学家》里面关于墨西哥湾漏油事件的英语文章，高分奖励哟。
http://www.economist.com/node/14548839 直接点进去 上面有~~
如下是内容（给你参考下哈）：
IT IS bad enough that Mexico’s economy is in deep recession, triggered by its close links to the ailing United States. To make matters worse, the country’s oil instry, its fiscal cash-cow for the past three decades, is declining swiftly (see chart). As recently as 2004 Cantarell, the country’s main offshore field, proced 2.1m barrels per day (b/d) of crude. Now its output is just 600,000 b/d. There are no obvious replacements: 23 of the 32 biggest fields are in decline. Barring big new finds, the world’s seventh-largest oil procer is forecast to become a net importer by 2017.
The Mexican treasury is ill-prepared for this. Taxes and royalties from Pemex, the state-owned oil monopoly, have accounted for almost two-fifths of federal revenues in recent years, compensating for one of Latin America’s weakest tax regimes (which collects just 11% of GDP). If oil output drops below 2m b/d, as many instry-watchers fear, the government would be forced to cut spending by more than 10%—or jack up taxes correspondingly, to avoid an unsustainable budget deficit. This might threaten economic recovery.
There is no mystery behind the decline. The constitution bans private investment in hydrocarbons. Ever since Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated foreign oil companies in 1938, the state oil monopoly has been seen by many politicians, especially from the formerly ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and its offshoots, as the untouchable bone marrow of Mexican sovereignty. To make matters worse, Pemex has been run more in the interests of its workers and their trade unions than of the Mexican people, its notional owners.
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All this has curbed the country’s ability to capitalise on its geological wealth. Since many oil-exploration projects take longer than the six-year presidential term to bear fruit, the politicians have a powerful incentive to spend oil revenues rather than reinvest them. From 1983 to 2000 Pemex’s annual investment budget was a paltry $3 billion. Until recently Cantarell’s bounty disguised this. After the conservative National Action Party (PAN) broke the PRI’s seven-decade grip on power in 2000, Pemex started to invest more. But higher labour and equipment costs absorbed much of the increase. Much of the new money was ploughed into Chicontepec, a project in the state of Veracruz that Pemex hoped would replace Cantarell. But this is yielding just 29,000 b/d so far.
Opportunity beckons beneath the deeper waters of the Gulf of Mexico, where some 50 billion barrels of oil are thought to rest. In the American part of the Gulf, 300 or so deepwater wells are drilled each year. Last month Britain’s BP found a big new field (with perhaps 3 billion barrels) there. Pemex has drilled just ten deepwater wells, but found little oil. It lacks the expertise, technology and capital it needs.
Even if Mexico allowed private companies to explore for oil, they would have to invest $10 billion a year to halt the decline in output, reckons David Shields, who edits a specialist magazine on Mexican oil. Under today’s law, in which private firms can only act as service providers for Pemex, that investment would be much higher, he says.
Felipe Calderón, the president, has tried to address the problem. A law approved last year is supposed to make Pemex more agile, by appointing independent directors and separating its contracts from government-procurement proceres. But to gain the opposition’s votes in Congress he dropped a key proposal that would have allowed contract prices to vary according to the success or failure of exploration. Pemex will be able to pay extra in some circumstances, but is explicitly barred from linking these incentives to proction.
To implement this vaguely worded legislation, Mr Calderón last month appointed Juan José Suárez Coppel to head Pemex. He was once its finance director, and has private-sector experience. His job will be to pilot the negotiations with private oil-service firms. The government has not yet published guidelines for these contracts, and no deals are expected until next year. Few are optimistic about them. “Companies are used to calling things by their names,” says Luis Miguel Labardini, an energy consultant. “This game of syntax, of finding a semantic formula to match ‘proctivity improvements’ or ‘cost efficiencies’ to output, is going to be too much for them.”
Mr Calderón last month called for a second energy reform. Much could be done even without changing the constitution, by linking the value of service contracts to proction and slimming Pemex, where the payroll of 143,000 is at least 30,000 too big. But it is hard to see discussion on a new law before the previous one has even been implemented, and harder still to foresee its approval, since the PRI and its allies gained a majority in the lower house of Congress in a mid-term election in July. Some PRI leaders have ties to the oil workers’ union. And big lay-offs in the trough of recession would anyway be politically toxic. Sooner or later fiscal reality will force change. But by then the oil age may be over.
『玖』 求一句英语翻译 经济学的 摘自拉姆齐(Ramsey)1928年发布的a mathematical theory of saving
储蓄率乘以消费来的边际效应源 应总等于 效用总的净享乐率和最大可能享乐率的差值。
参考http://www.tianya.cn/New/PublicForum/Content.asp?idArticle=145596&strItem=develop
『拾』 经济学专业的英语翻译，实在搞不好
请注意，在决定预算线降BB'的价格比率下，Agent选择消费组合（消费束）E。但是，由于专这一消费组合属在一无差异曲线扭结点发生，边际替代率必须等于预算线的斜率的条件不能满足。在E点左边，边际替带率比预算线陡峭，而到了E点的右边，边际替带率比预算线平坦。不过，在这些价格下，只有一个最佳消费组合。但是这是不正确的，那就是当Agent面临由预算线BB’描述的陡峭的价格率时。在这里预算线与无差异曲线相切，这意味着在这个价格下，Agent没有与任何高于预算线的消费组合有任何不同。
价格消费路径如图3.9a所示，相应的需求曲线如图Figure3.9b所示。请注意此时需求曲线有平坦部分，这表明在不同的价格下可以有巨大的需求量。
总之，如果我们的需求分析偏离定价人限定的消费，即我们在Chapter2中所示（假设偏好、不满意、自私凸出），那么可能会产生一些古怪的需求曲线。通过接受这些假设，我们可以保证我们的需求曲线将不会猛涨，也能保证他们在每一个价格下有一个独特的需求量。